Frédéric Gaspoz on risk and rationality
In the same way that a kilo is always equal to 1 kg and 1 hour is always 1 hour, the risk can be measured, and some Risk is always the same risk. Is it really so? An object of 1 kg on earth has another weight on the moon. For Einstein, although time is relative. For a young athlete is not one kilogram, for an old one kg is heavy. Sometimes, for example, when one is totally absorbed by something, an hour passes very quickly, sometimes, for example, when join forces to do something, we have the subjective feeling that time is endless. In addition, the risk depends on the reference system. Moreover, there is a measure objective physical risk. The risk is a subjective and therefore highly dependent differences in perceptions and judgments.
Is it possible that people be rational about the risks? To be rational in trying something basically means that analytical and logical. For this reason, the risks must be quantified and should not be a logarithm to calculate it. There must be an agreement on the rules of measurement. Must be free of emotional or worldviews. The people manage the risks so analytical and logical? Is there agreement on the conceptualization and measurement of risk?
I will answer these questions, first show how the meaning and use of the term "risk" has changed over time. Secondly, I will try to explain why it is difficult to define end of "risk." Third, I will illustrate how people perceive and feel differently Legal risk solutions. Then, processes and social mechanisms also influence the perception of risk. In the end, the conclusion will discuss how far it is possible to be rational about risks, even if it is difficult.
The term "risk" has been used for the first time in the business language of the 19th century Italian (Rammstedt 1992: 1045-1050). Point etymological roots in Greek, by which can mean both the roots and cliff: this means that the cliffs around which a merchant vessel must navigate. Plus the boat sails along the cliffs, the faster it reaches the port, which is certainly a gain. If the ship is too close to the cliff and sank, then there is a loss. Until the 19th century, the time industrial development company, the risk was understood as the opportunity costs for the creation of prosperity and wealth (Dake 1992: 21-37). Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) he was the first to describe how to measure probability. Laplace's theory of risk "(1816), in particular, has had a decisive influence on design risk and the emerging insurance industry. The simple formula
Risk = probability x ill
suggests predictability and therefore control risk. Until 60 late 20th century, a concept of risk has been very limited predominant. The expansion and differentiation of the concept of "risk" seems to be unnecessary because confidence in almost limitless possibilities of science and technology.
Since the 70s, the term "risk" has gained a lot of sense and complexity. On the one hand, the obvious negative consequences of technology are certainly one reason for this development. On the other hand, the conception of man was the adoption of a full rationality bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). It became clear that humans can not be totally sound like a computer, the ability Cognitive is limited, humans make mistakes and use simple heuristics, which are different legislative solutions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982: 3-20). This change in the design the man can also affect the unlimited confidence in science and technology, and therefore the concept of risk. The notion of risk is very popular in today's society. Some authors (eg, Ulrich Beck 1986) calls post-modern society, including the risk of society. In fact, changing the sense of risk and risk perception and its dependence on cultural change and historical events clear that the risk is a subjective and an objective view of reality (Douglas and Wildavsky 1993: 113-137).
It is not so easy to find a clear definition of risk. Of course, it can be viewed as the product of probability and damage. It can also be defined by different logs. A risk function could focus on the probability of loss, the size of the loss, the loss maximum product of the probability of impact and the loss of variance, the semi-variance of all possible losses, and so on. Some experts even use second-order probability. The probability, in the sense of uncertainty, the best solution is the correct probability. But a definition of risk is based on a formula not sufficient. Several scientific disciplines, and different industries work with different concepts of risk. The risk is widely used, and contested multifaceted concept. The concept could include qualitative aspects, eg economic, psychological, social, cultural, environmental, or philosophical. One could, for example, that only the negative consequences are identified as a risk, or may be included positive elements for the definition of risk. The first is called called pure risk and speculative risk (Weber Brachinger & 1997). But it is easier to give a definition of risk status on own risk. A situation basic or minimum risk in the sense of a structure of decision is always an alternative. At least one of the alternatives has at least two results. He is not sure what the result will choose the alternative, but we know the probability (Scholz & Tietjen 2002: 176).
Some difficulties can be experience in assessing probabilities (Hansson, 1989: 107-112). There are cultural differences in the perception of probabilities. peoples of Asia, including China, Indonesia, Malaysians and think less in terms of risk and uncertainty that people in Western countries (Phillips & Wright, 1977: 507-515). Asians are not probabilistic thinkers. They know or can not, for them is an event occur or not. The people of Western thinkers are more probabilistic. They express their uncertainties in terms of probabilities. This is a cultural effect rather than a cognitive deficit.
In general, people tend to underestimate the chances high and low probabilities of overestimating, as postulated in the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahmeman, 1992: 297-323). Outlook theory also assumes a single point of reference, which determines whether the result is perceived as a loss or a gain (Tversky and Kahnemann 1979: 263-291). As defined cognitive consequences of the situation is perceived as a good profit or loss. Therefore, the gain function is different from the loss of function. The utility function is concave for gains and the utility function of losses is convex. The prospect theory as an example of subjective utility theory is a descriptive theory, based on empirical findings. This shows that people act differently than prescriptive solutions. However, the fact that it is possible to describe the behavior of decision-making test math that people use certain rules and do not behave irrationally.
People also use some heuristic or systematic bias in its decisions, which are also in conflict with the policy solution and to the extent it is not rational. The availability heuristic and the base rate fallacy are examples of these biases (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1973, 207-232). For example, after a plane crash, the risk of flying is a higher capacity because the negative event is always in the mind and available. People regularly ignore the base rate in their judgments, which contradicts the Bayes theorem (Scholz, 1987). In some cases, such as when the decision should be taken within a short time and not all the necessary information is available, the analysis strategy can be very good heuristics (Gigerenzer 1997, 107-125). People acts in a way that is adaptive, a development standpoint, "Wise."
In addition to the quantitative description of risk as a product of the probability and damage, people also qualitative characteristics such as voluntariness, controllability, or potentially catastrophic in their perception risk and trials (Slovic et al. 1985). One source of risk is perceived as less risky if people are exposed to it voluntarily, the feeling of having control on risk, or see no possibility of a disaster. In a factor analysis approach – also called the psychometric paradigm in research on perception risks – such qualitative characteristics would be reduced to two major risk factors for fear "and" unknown risk "(Slovic, 1987: 280-285; Slovic, 1992).
Emotions can also play a role in decision making and risk perception (Schwarzer 2000: 433-440; Finucane et al. 2000: 1-17) and motivation (Lopes, 1995: 29-50). The concern, in particular, increases the perceived risk (Sjöberg 1998: 85-93). However, positive emotions You can also have an influence on judgments of risk (Lerner & Keltner 2000: 473-493). Therefore, if emotions influence judgments of risk, it can be difficult for people to be rational about risk.
Socially there are processes that determine the social impact of a risk. Even small risks (considered Low by experts) may have a strong social impact. According to the theory of social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al.1988: 177-187) of the individual reactions or groups can lead to a domino effect that can affect even the whole society. Example is the case of Three Mile Island. Although the problem of nuclear reactor was not reflected in losses, the case becomes increasingly important and lead to consequences that are timely, spatial and thematic far from the case "Three Mile Island" (Slovic Jungermann and 1993: 89-107).
In conclusion, it is difficult to be rational about risk. Risk formulas may give the impression that can be treated in an objective and rational. But keep in mind that risk is a subjective construction. There are different conceptualizations of risk. People differ in how perceive or judge of a risk. They have different interests, different reference systems take different qualitative aspects into account. First, human behavior generally adapted as discussed with the concept of bounded rationality. Moreover, the efficiency can be improved by giving instructions to define the methods and tools to help with the decision. Third, different conceptualizations of risk and individual differences in perception of risk must be taken into account.
To be rational in the context of modern portfolio theory, for example, is to accept that people differ in risk aversion. Therefore, the advisors of the client to specify the client's risk profile and develop investment strategies according to the profile. People can make a better assessment of risk if they learn to think probabilistically and break the situation in simple events. Change the format of the information in a format that can often likely to further reduce the base rate fallacy (Gigerenzer And Hoffrage 1995: 684-704). It is advantageous to present information with frequencies of view of possible events rather than probabilities indicate abstract. There are also methods and tools to improve decision making, for example, the cost-benefit analysis or analysis of multi-award winning utility theory. As for the communication risks where the risk affects people other than the power of decision, it is necessary to launch a dialogue on risks. To optimize this dialogue we can all affected must be involved in the quality and the differences between them must be accepted (Covello and Allen, 1988; Jungermann et al. 1991). If people act rationally when they could – even if it is difficult to be rational about risk.
References
Aumann, RJ (1997). Rationality and bounded rationality. Games and Economic Behavior, 21, 2-14.
Bazerman, MH (1997). Judgement in managerial decision making. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Brachinger, HW & Weber, M. (1996). Risks such as primitive: a study on measures of perceived risk. OR Spektrum, 18 (4).
Burns, WJ, Slovic, P., Kasperson, Kasperson RE JX, Renn O. And Emami, S. (1993). Incorporating structural models into research in the social amplification of risk: Implications for theory construction and decision decisions. Risk Analysis 13, 611-623.
Covello, VT & Allen, FW (1988). Seven Golden risk communication. Washington Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis.
Dake, K. (1992). Myths of nature: culture and the construction social risk. Journal of Social Issues, 48, 21-37.
M. Douglas & Wildavsky A. (1993). Risiko und Kultur. In: Krohn, W. Krücken & G. Riske Technologien: Reflexion und Regulation (113-137). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Finucane, ML, Alhakami A., Slovic, P. & Johnson, SM (2000). The effect on judgmental heuristics of the risks and benefits. Journal of the decision-making behavior, 13, 1-17.
Fischhoff, B. (1994). Acceptable risk: a conceptual proposal. Safety and Environment, 5, 1-28.
Gigerenzer G, Hoffrage U (1995) How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: frequency formats. Psychological Review 102: 684-704
Gigerenzer, G. (1997). Ecological intelligence: an adaptation for frequencies. Psychologische Beiträge, 39, 107-125.
Hansson, SO (1989). risk rating. Risk Analysis, 9 (1), 107-112.
Hastie, R. Dawes, RM (2001). In rational choice in an uncertain world, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Jungermann, H., Rohrmann, B. & Wiedemann, PM (1991). Risikokontroversen:, Konflikt Konzepte, Kommunikation. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Jungermann, H., Slovic, P. (1993). Risikowahrnehmung individueller Charakteristika. In: Bayerische Rück (Hg), ISt Konstruktiva Risiko ein. München: Knesebeck 89-107.
Kahnemann, D., Slovic, P. And Tversky, A. (1982). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D. And Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
Kahneman, D. And Tversky, A. (1996). In fact cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103, 582-591.
Kasperson, RE, Slovic, P., Renn, O., Brown, HS, Emel, J., Goble, R., Kasperson, JX and Ratick, S. (1988). The social amplification of risk: a conceptual framework. Risk Analysis, 8, 177-187.
Laplace, PS (1816). Philosophical essay on probabilities 1. Paris.
Lerner, JS & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond Valencia to a specific model of emotional influences on judgments and decisions. Cognition and emotion, 14 (4), p. 473-493.
Lopes, LL (1995). In the modeling of risky choice: Why reasons matter. In J.-P. Caverni, FH & Baron H. Jungermann (Eds.), Contributions to decision making – I (S. 29-50). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Luhmann, N. (1993). Risiko Gefahr und. In: Krohn, W. And Krücken, G. (ed.). Riske Technologien: Reflexion und Regulation (138-185). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Phillips, LD & Wright, GN (1977). Cultural differences in uncertainty and show the evaluation of probabilities. In: H. Jungermann Zeeuw and GD (Eds.). Tomada Decision and Change in Human Case, P. 507-515. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Phillips, LD & Wright, NG (1983). Conceptually, the heuristic point and biases in probabilistic thinking. In: Analysis and assist decision-making, PC Humphreys, O. Svenson, and A. Vari (Eds.). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Plous, S. (1993). Psychology of Judgement and decision. New York: McGraw Hill.
O. Rammstedt (1992). Risiko. In: J. Ritter (Ed.). Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 8, 1045-1050. Basel: Schwabe.
Renn, O. (1998). Three decades of research Risk: achievements and challenges. Journal of Risk Research, one (1), 49-71.
Rohrmann, B (1998). The concept of risk: The concept of risk: epistemological and empirical considerations. In: Stewart MG & Melchers RE (ed.): Integrated Risk Assessment: Applications and Regulations: Applications and Regulation (39-46). Rotterdam: Balkam.
Scholz, RW (1987). Cognitive strategies in thought stochastic. Reidel: Dordrecht.
Scholz, RW and O. Tietjen. (2002). Integrated Case Study Methods: quantitative and qualitative Knowledge Integration. Thousand Oaks, Sage.
Schwarzer, N. (2000). Emotion, cognition and decision making. Cognition and emotion, 14 (4), 433-440.
Simon, HA (1957). Models of man. New York: Wiley.
L. Sjöberg (1998). Worry and risk perception. Risk Analysis, 18 (1), 85-93.
Slovic, P. (1987). The perception of risk. Science 236, 280-285.
Slovic, P. (1992). Risk Perception: Reflections on the psychometric paradigm. In: D.
Golding & S. Krimsky (ed.). Theories of Risk (117-152). London Praeger.
Slovic, P. (2000). The perception of risk. London: Earthscan Publication Ltd.
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B. (1985). Risk Characterization perceived. In: Kates, RW, Hohenems, C. And Kasperson, JX (ed.). Perilous Progress: Managing technological risks. Boulder: Westview.
Tversky, A. And Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for assessing frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-132.
Tversky, A. And Kahneman, D (1982). Judgments under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 3-20). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tversky, A. And Kahneman, D. (1992). The Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323.
About the Author
Mentoring In the Academy
|
|
Weight Gain During Pregnancy (Hardcover) $48.96 Drawing on a review of current literature and independent analysis of existing databases, this report reexamines the 1990 Institute of Medicine guidelines for weight gain during pregnancy. The report presents updated target ranges for weight gain during pregnancy and guidelines for proper measurement, and includes a range of recommended gain specifically for obese women. The guidelines are intended for American women and women in other developed countries, but are not intended for use in areas of the world where women are substantially shorter or thinner than American women or where adequate obstetric services are not available. Annotation ¿2010 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com) |
|
|
The Formula $11.44 Are you frustrated by low-fat/high-carbohydrate or all-protein diets that don't work? Tired of white-knuckle restrictions or doing math at every meal? Fed up with a constant craving for sugars and carbohydrates? Do you wish you had a magic formula for losing weight and keeping it off? Well, now you do. . . .Pioneering weight loss and certified sports nutritionists Gene and Joyce Daoust have personally helped thousands of people lose weight, tone up, and enjoy a healthier, more fit lifestyle. Their advice? Drop the rice cakes and calorie-counting, and stop trying to figure out those complicated"food blocks."The Formula teaches an easy way to balanced nutrition that will have you burning fat 24-hours a day while eating foods you enjoy! Featuring menu plans, shopping lists, and progress charts,The Formula provides a personalized program for each person's specific needs and body type. So whether you're a couch potato, a professional athlete, or somewhere in between, you'll discover:* Five different versions of the Formula–and how to find the right one for your weight and activity level* The 21-Day Fat Flush Formula for accelerated weight loss* More than 200 delicious recipes, including perfectly balanced 40-30-30 fajitas, chili, pork tenderloin, and New York cheesecake* Special Kids' Favorites and Family Style meals* Healthy advice on prepared foods, fast foods, and vegetarian mealsA plan for life,The Formula is a dieter's dream–the lifetime secret to losing weight, staying slim, and feeling great! |